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Abstract
We propose the schemes of quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) based on secret
transmitting order of particles. In these protocols, the secret transmitting order of particles ensures
the security of communication, and no secret messages are leaked even if the communication
is interrupted for security. This strategy of security for communication is also generalized to
quantum dialogue. It not only ensures the unconditional security but also improves the efficiency
of communication.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of information technology, quantum cryptography has been
an important and attractive study area. It ensures that the secret message is intelligible
only for the two legitimated parties of communication without being altered or stolen. Since
Bennett and Brassard proposed BB84 protocol [1] which is a proven secure protocol, many
quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes have been proposed and the experimental feasi-
bility of them is also discussed [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Although the methods used in these
schemes are various, the basic principle is the same, i.e., the two remote legitimated users
(Alice and Bob) establish a shared secret key through the transmission of quantum signals,
after this they can use this key to encrypt or decrypt the secret messages. This means
the two parties have to share a secret key before the secret message is transmitted. As for
communication, this beforehand step undoubtedly reduces the efficiency of communication.
Our motive to build quantum channel is not only to transmit information securely without
being eavesdropped on but also to improve the efficiency of communication.
In recent years, a novel scheme, quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) has been
proposed and pursued [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. In this scheme the transmitted message can
be read only after a final transmission of an additional classical information without first
establishing a shared secret key. In 2002, Bostro¨m and Felbinger [11] proposed a Ping-Pong
QSDC protocol using EPR pairs as quantum message carriers, which is insecure for a noisy
quantum channel as shown by Wo´jcik [16]. Cai and Deng gave a scheme using single photons
as a quantum one-time pad to encode the secret messages [12, 13]. Meanwhile, Deng et al put
forward a two-step QSDC protocol using blocks of EPR pairs [14]. In this two-step scheme
the EPR pairs are divided into two sequences, checking-sequence and message-sequence,
which are sent by two steps, and the receiver need to check the security of the channel twice
(one for checking-sequence and another for message-sequence). In this paper, two QSDC
schemes based on transmitting order of particles are proposed. In these two schemes, we
also use EPR pairs as the messages carriers, but the transmitting order of particles is secret
to any other people except the sender himself(herself), so the eavesdropper (Eve) is not
able to get any secret messages by performing a valid measurement. And we need checking
security only once. Furthermore, we also apply this strategy of secret transmitting order to
bidirectional communication, which is so-called quantum dialogue [17]. Our present schemes
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not only ensure the unconditional security but also improve the efficiency of communication.
The concrete protocols for QSDC are given in Section 2. In Section 3 the security of the
strategy is discussed. In Section 4 we generalize the application of the strategy based on
secret transmitting order to quantum dialogue. Finally, we give a discussion and summary
on the present schemes.
II. SCHEMES FOR QSDC
An EPR pair can be in one of the following four states,
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉i|1〉i′ ± |1〉i|0〉i′ ), (1)
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉i|0〉i′ ± |1〉i|1〉i′), (2)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are eigenvectors of Pauli operator σz. The subscripts i and i′ stand for
the two correlated particles of an EPR pair. Firstly, Alice and Bob agree on that the four
local operations U0 = I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, U1 = σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|, U2 = σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|
and U3 = iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0| represent two bits classical information 00, 11, 01, and 10,
respectively. Alice prepares ordered N EPR photon pairs in the same state. Here we assume
this state is |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉i|1〉i′ − |1〉i|0〉i′).
On these preconditions, we give the following two schemes for QSDC.
A. A round trip scheme based on the secret transmitting order of particles
(S1) Alice divides the EPR pairs into two partner-photon sequences
[H1, H2, · · · , Hi, · · · , HN ] and [T1′ , T2′ , · · · , Ti′, · · · , TN ′], where Hi and Ti′ are the
two photons correlated with each other in the i-th (i = 1, 2, · · · N) photon pair, and H(T )
stands for “home (travel)”. Then she sends the T sequence to Bob.
(S2) Bob chooses a sufficiently large subset of photons randomly in T sequence as checking
set (C-set) and the rest as message set (M-set). By performing the four unitary operations
Ui, (i = 0, 1, 2, 3), he encodes his checking message on C-set and secret messages on M-set,
respectively.
(S3) Bob disturbs the initial order of the T sequence and returns them to Alice, that is,
the rearranged order of T sequence is completely secret to any other people but Bob himself.
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(S4) After verifying Alice has received all T photons, Bob announces C-set and the secret
order in it. According to these information and the initial states, Alice can perform Bell
measurement and deduce the probable operations performed by Bob. Then she announces
her results about Bob’s operations.
(S5) By comparing his checking messages with Alice’s results, Bob can decide whether a
Eve is online. If Eve is online, Bob terminates the communication. Otherwise, he exposes
the secret transmitted order of M-set according to which Alice can read the secret messages
by Bell measurement.
In this protocol, one particle (T photon) of each EPR pair undergoes a round trip to
transfer information. This makes it impossible for Eve to get two particles of an EPR pair
simultaneously. By disturbing the original order of particles, the security of communication
is protected from the intercept-and-resend attack. However, the efficiency of a round trip is
lower than a one-way trip after all, so we ameliorate this protocol to the one-way protocol
based on the strategy of secret transmitting order.
B. An one way scheme based on the secret transmitting order of particles
(S1
′
) After preparing EPR pairs, Alice chooses a sufficiently large subset randomly
as the checking set (C-set) and the rest pairs as message set (M-set). Different from
the above scheme, here the C(M)-set is composed of EPR pairs but not single pho-
tons. Then Alice encodes her secret messages on M-set and checking messages on C-
set, respectively, by performing the four operations on one particle (e.g. the first one)
of each EPR pair. For convenience of describing, we denote the N EPR pairs with
P1(1, 1
′), P2(2, 2′), · · · , Pi(i, i′), · · · , PN(N,N ′). Taking C-set for example. Assuming Alice’s
checking message is (0100101101 · · ·), and she chooses the first 50 EPR pairs as C-set. Then
she encodes 01 on P1(1, 1
′), 00 on P2(2, 2′), 10 on P3(3, 3′), · · ·, and so on.
(S2
′
) With an order known only by herself, Alice sends these particles to Bob one by
one, namely, the particles are sent as single form but not as pairs. For instance, Alice sends
the particles with an order S1(2), S2(1), S3(51), S4(5
′), S5(2′), S6(60), S7(10), S8(1′),· · ·,
Sj(x),· · ·, Sk(x′),· · ·,S2N (y), where Sj(i)(j ∈ 1, 2, · · · , 2N, i ∈ 1, 2, · · · , N) denotes Alice sends
particle i with the jth turn.
(S3
′
) After verifying Bob has received all the 2N particles, Alice declares the initial
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state and the matching information of two particles in C-set through a public channel. For
instance, S2 ∼ S8, S1 ∼ S5, · · · , Sj ∼ Sk, · · ·.
(S4
′
) Alice and Bob check the security of the channel. Bob performs a Bell-basis measure-
ment according to the information from Alice. Comparing with the initial state, he obtains
the result messages. Then he tells Alice about his result messages through a classical chan-
nel. By comparing Bob’s result messages with the checking messages as well as analyzing
the error rate, Alice can judge out whether Eve is on line.
(S5
′
) If the channel is secure, Alice exposes the matching information of two particles
in M-set through a classical channel. Otherwise, Alice terminates this communication and
starts next one from beginning.
(S6
′
) By performing a Bell-basis measurement, Bob obtains the secret messages.
In this protocol all the particles undergo only a one-way trip, which greatly reduces the
opportunity of the particles being intercepted than the round trip and two-step protocol
[14], and thus improves the efficiency of communication.
III. SECURITY OF THE QSDC SCHEMES BASED ON SECRET TRANSMIT-
TING ORDER OF PARTICLES
Firstly, the security of our present schemes are based on the secret order of the particles,
while the security of two-step scheme [14] lies in the security of the transmission of C-
sequence. In a noisy channel, Eve can hide her eavesdropping in the noise. If Alice and Bob
could not detect the eavesdropper in the transmission of C-sequence, Eve would capture
easily the two particles in each EPR pair and take Bell-basis measurement on them, i.e. the
secret messages would be leaked partly or all. However, this situation can be avoided in our
present schemes.
Eve can not only takes intercept-and-resend attack but also takes entangle-and-measure
attack in the whole communication process. In the round trip scheme, under the condition
that Eve uses a intercept-and-resend attack, he also creates N EPR pairs which are in the
same state |Ψ〉ht with (ht) are Eve’s two particles correlated mutually. When Alice sends the
T photon sequence to Bob, Eve intercepts these T photons and sends her t photons to Bob.
Bob would take t for T and encodes he secret message and checking messages by performing
the unitary operations as described above. If Bob returns them to Alice with the initial
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order, Eve can intercepts the “T (t)” photons again and takes Bell-basis measurement on her
ht pairs to learn Bob’s secret messages and checking messages. Eve applies the same unitary
operations on the T photons which she intercepted and sends them to Alice. As a result,
Eve not only gain the secret messages, but also will not be detected. However, in our scheme
in that the initial order of T (t) sequence is disturbed by Bob in the returning process, so
Eve is not able to distinguish the t photon corresponding to her h photon. A blind encoding
on T sequence can be detected. In the one-way scheme, all particles are transmitted with
a secret order. Even if Eve intercepts all the particles, it is difficult for her to distinguish
the partners of each pair and take a valid measurement. So her interception is not useful.
Particularly, it should be noticed that in the one way scheme, only one transmission process
is used. This not only greatly reduces the opportunity of the particles to be intercepted but
also improves the efficiency of communication.
On the basis of the above analysis, our present QSDC schemes using the strategy of secret
transmitting order are secure.
IV. GENERALIZATION TO QUANTUM DIALOGUE BASED ON SECRET
TRANSMITTING ORDER
The above protocols are mono-directional communication. Using this strategy, we also
can generalize the above QSDC schemes to a bidirectional communication, the so-called
quantum dialogue [17].
Suppose that Alice and Bob has respective secret messages consisting of 2N bits to
transmit to the other side. They can do according to the following steps.
(S1) To securely carry out a secret dialogue, Alice firstly prepares a large enough num-
ber(M) of ordered EPR pairs, all in the same state (e.g., |ψ0,0〉ht). Then she encodes her
secret messages MAm on N particles t (t = t1 , t2 , t3 · · · tN ) (M-set) and the checking messages
MAc on the rest (M −N) t particles (C-set) by means of the four unitary operations above.
(S2) Alice sends the particles string t to Bob in order. In accordance with the order of
the travel particles t, Alice stores the remaining particles h with him.
(S3) Confirming Bob has received the sequence t, Alice tell Bob the M-set and C-set.
Then Bob also encodes his secret messages MBm and checking messages M
B
c on M-set and
C-set, respectively. Then Bob disturbs the order of t sequence and returns them to Alice.
6
(S4) After confirming the receiving of Alice, Bob announces the secret order of the par-
ticles t of C set. Alice performs Bell-basis measurement on particles t and corresponding
partners in C-set and announces the results Rc. Then both Alice and Bob can deduce
the probable checking messages mBc and m
A
c of the other sides by m
B
c = Rc − MAc and
mAc = Rc −MBc , respectively.
(S5) Alice and Bob publicly announce their respective true checking messages MAc and
MBc . If the error rates of m
A
c versus M
A
c , m
B
c versus M
B
c are relatively high, the commu-
nication should be terminated. Otherwise, Bob announces the secret order of M-set. Then
Alice measures on the corresponding EPR pairs and publicly announces the results Rm.
(S6) Alice and Bob decode the secret messages of the other side in terms of MBm =
Rm −MAm and MAm = Rm −MBm , respectively.
Similarly, because the transmitting order of particles is secret before the security checking,
Eve cannot perform a valid measurement, so the unconditional security is ensured.
V. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
The present schemes for mono-directional and bidirectional communication are secure in
an ideal lossless channel as the analysis above. In a practical quantum channel, there are
noise and loss which will threaten the security of quantum communication. We need to
illustrate that our scheme is still secure in a weak noisy channel. The security-checking is
based on the statistical analysis for the error rate. Under a condition of weak noise, a higher
error rate may indicates the eavesdropping. Hence our scheme is still valid.
In the meantime, we also notice that in most protocols on direct communication, once
Eve is detected, as the communication is terminated, the secret messages are discarded. It
is noticeable that direct communication is different from QKD. QKD allows the secret key
between the two legitimate users to be produced over again for security. But the motive of
QSDC is communicating messages directly, discarding messages means leakage of secret. As
for our present schemes, the secret messages are hidden in the disordered transmitting order
of particles. Eve cannot get any useful message without a correct order even if she captures
the particles. Hence, no message is leaked except the communication is terminated, and the
secret messages can be used repeatedly between the two legitimate users.
In summary, basing on the strategy of secret transmitting order, two novel QSDC schemes
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and a quantum dialogue scheme have been proposed. This strategy ensures the security
of communication not only in an ideal lossless channel but also in a weak noisy channel.
Moreover, because the secret messages is impossibly leaked even if when communication
is terminated for security, the secret messages can be transmitted repeatedly between the
sender and the receiver.
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